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ABSTRACT
Inscribing names into the firmament of symbolic orders is crucial
argues Rancière who traces the symbolic distribution of bodies
into those that ‘one sees’ and those that ‘one does not see’. The
issue of accounted visibility-cum-audibility does not only lie
within the specific conflict configuration but also within the
geopolitical dynamics of the ‘border’ as well as ‘body-borders’
within individuals and communities concerned. One such case
can be found at the borderlands of Pakistan with Afghanistan, of
the trans-local post-9/11 ‘Wars on Terror’ as well as at the border-
lands of Pakistan itself, subjected to invisibility and rumbling
noises of conflict and displacement through hegemonic centring
of discourses and exclusionary, violent practices of the ‘Wars on
Terror’. This article is a collaborative work on experiences of
conflict-induced displacement, political violence and narratives
of everyday life negotiations thereof, based on field research and
interviews (individual as well as group ones) conducted in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and around the capital of Islamabad with those
internally displaced from North Waziristan, South Waziristan and
Kurram Agencies. The aim is to juxtapose vociferous and deliber-
ate hegemonic practices of invisibility and de-solidarisation in
public discourses and counter-insurgency interventions vis-a-vis
certain marginalised communities and citizens with the latter’s
own narratives about their experiences and understandings of
state-society relations, relevant stakeholders, public discourses
and labelling practices used (such as ‘polio threat’ and ‘terrorist’).
We attempt to trace andmap howpeople experience and negoti-
ate political violence, (protracted) conflict-induced displacement
and the paucity of governance service provisions in a wider con-
text of contested nation-building and transnational high-
intensity conflict. Given repeated, cyclic and/or protracted experi-
ences of displacement, flight and migration, combined with
emerging narratives of marginalisation, exploitation and socio-
political exclusion, one needs to ask what are the consequences
of such transnational conflict and displacement configurations
for individual as well as collective social resilience, withstanding
ideological manipulation and cooptation into the conflict theatre,
as well as for the capacity to develop and implement (alternative
and sustainable) livelihoods in the different spaces one has to
move in as an individual as well as a family-cum-community
member in times of protracted conflict and displacement.
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‘When I looked behind, it seemed to me as [if] all the stars are falling from the sky.’1
Inscribing names into the firmament of symbolic orders is crucial, argues
Rancière, in particular when those names are part of a collective destiny, such
as a simple citizen vis-à-vis those engaging in promises (such as fighting
terrorism) or in contracts (such as peace deals, multilateral military coopera-
tion or border regimes) – because ‘whoever is nameless cannot speak’
(Rancière 2006, 24ff). Rancière traces the symbolic distribution of bodies
into those that ‘one sees’ and those that ‘one does not see’; into those who
have ‘visible’, recognised accounts vis-à-vis those who may actually speak,
but whose articulations are not accounted for, but are regarded as ‘noise’
rather than as ‘voice’ (Rancière 2006, 24ff). The issue of visibility-cum-
audibility lies not only within the specific conflict configuration but also
within the geopolitical dynamics of the ‘border’ as well as ‘body-borders’
within individuals and communities concerned (i.e. borders inscribed
through discourses and practices between citizens). One such case can be
found at the borderlands of Pakistan with Afghanistan, of the trans-local
post-9/11 ‘Wars on Terror’, subjected via its people to invisibility, rumbling
noises of conflict and displacement through the hegemonic centring of
discourses and exclusionary, violent practices of respective military actions.
Reflections on Research Objectives and Concerns of the Case Study
This article is a collaborative exploration of experiences of conflict-induced
displacement and political violence and the narratives of the everyday life
negotiations thereof. It is based on field research and over 50 interviews (indi-
vidual as well as group ones) conducted by the authors during late 2015 to mid-
2016 in Peshawar and Lakki Marwat (a district of the province Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa [KPk]) and around the capital of Islamabad with internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs) from North Waziristan, South Waziristan2 and Kurram
Agencies.3 Interview partners hail from various walks of life in terms of literacy/
education, profession/employment, site of displacement, religion, gender and
age. The data were collected using an interview guide in English and Pashto
language with a list of issues for questions on the experiences of displacement,
but allowing for flexibility in the semi-structured interview process given the
often traumatic nature of the narrative, the lack of experience of being inter-
viewed, as well as the high level of suspicion among the internally displaced
towards interviewers. Interviewees were approached in common places of
assembly of IDPs or via friends and relatives at their home, using cues from
local contact persons familiar to the research team members as well as snowball
sampling to identify further interview partners. We decided to approach those
living outside of camps, who represent the overall majority of the internally
displaced, thereby avoiding problems with security agencies known for
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restricting access to camp communities. One problematic side effect was the
difficulty of reaching female IDPs, who are mostly restricted to their homes and
are far less present in the public gatherings and public spaces used to identify
potential interview partners. We rely therefore for that part to a large extent on
data provided by our research team member mentioned later, who is a local
from Kurram Agency and who collected this data as part of her thesis work.
A number of interviews took place in a group setting as people were suspicious,
unfamiliar or wary of individual interviews ‘behind closed doors’, more familiar
and comfortable with the notion of a ‘hujra’ – a room in a house used for social
entertainment, assembly and discussion in Pashtun society (or rather its male
members one must emphasise). For reasons of protecting our interview part-
ners’ identity and safety and addressing their concerns and suspicions about
being interviewed, only limited demographic background information was
collected (e.g. age, family status, professions and income level, timing and
trajectory of displacement), while names and exact dates are entirely omitted
in our work. Interviews were thus conducted off the record, often only taking
notes or making memory protocols; in quite a number of cases audio we were
allowed to record the interviews, whenever interview partners were comfortable
with it. These omissions are not without problems, reminding us of Rancière’s
concern that ‘whoever is nameless cannot speak’ and of the importance of
writing names into the sky of the symbolic order of the post-9/11 ‘Wars on
Terror’ (see Rancière 2006). For whatever it is worth and in whatever limited
way, we attempt to upload at least voices to the sky and hope that one day names
can follow.
In this article, we attempt to trace and map how people experience and
negotiate (protracted) conflict-induced displacement and the paucity of pub-
lic and private relief and service provisions, within a wider context of
contested nation-building and transnational high-intensity conflict. For the
scope of this article, we focus on two major themes emerging from the
interviews conducted as well as additional testimonies and material con-
sulted: first, the issue of curfews, checkpoints and the quest for respect for
those in the immediate course of displacement, when many encounter the
State in a contentious situation, marred by demands for security and control,
on the one hand, and offers of immediate emergency relief, shelter and
respect as a human being and citizen on the other. Second, no displacement,
as disruptive as it may be, takes place on a clean slate but within specific
sociocultural, political and economic parameters and stratifications, with
gender being one key denominator. Therefore, we trace and highlight the
experiences of female IDPs of displacement, invisibility and mobility, pre-
dominantly burdened by further marginalisation and gender-specific vulner-
abilities exacerbated by conflict-induced displacement. Both strands allow us
to map, indirectly, state-society relations and the long-term impact of such
counter-insurgency interventions as part of the glocal ‘Wars on Terror’ from
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a decentred, grassroots perspective more often than not rendered marginal,
invisible or unconsidered in prevailing public discourses. Out of repeated,
cyclic and/or protracted experiences of displacement, flight and migration
emerge narratives of marginalisation, exploitation and sociopolitical exclu-
sion. One key question to be asked is, therefore, what are the consequences of
such conflict-induced displacement configurations for individual as well as
collective social resilience as well as for the capacity to develop and imple-
ment (alternative and sustainable) livelihoods in the different spaces which
one must negotiate as an individual, family and community member in times
of protracted conflict and displacement. In the interviews conducted, a series
of understandings, practices and ideas of how to conceptualise and respond
to challenges of belonging, resilience and livelihood is displayed.
Notes on the Conflict, Intervention and Displacement Parameters
Brown University’s Cost of War project’s multi-disciplinary team investigated
‘the costs of the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the related violence
in Pakistan and Syria’.4 What is the record of the body count and what are the
glocal ramifications? Its co-director argues that the conflicts in Afghanistan and
Pakistan ‘have become one larger conflict’ due to a series of interlinkages such as
refugees and IDPs, drone strikes, cross-border military operations and transport
paths for military support equipment along with covert or overt US funding for
Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s war-related spending in terms of equipment,
training and operations (Crawford 2015, 1, 12–13).
The Pakistani military operation Zarb-e-Azb is evidence of these inter-
linked, translocal geopolitical border ‘Wars on Terror’, carried out where
‘most (19 out of 24) of the US drone strikes in 2014ʹ worldwide occurred
(Crawford 2015, 12). As with other military operations, large-scale internal
displacement emerged in its wake, further linked to US drone strikes that are
‘disruptive to livelihoods’ and ‘contribut[ing] to problems of displacement,
malnutrition and disease’ (Crawford 2015, 12f). It is difficult to establish
a clear record of the costs of war, given not only problems of who counts
what (or not) but moreover problems of assessing indirect costs of war, that
is, its negative effects on social and technical infrastructure, on displacement
and human security. Tallying the record of ‘costs’ other than loss of human
life or injury as direct outcomes, such as the psycho-social costs of the
experience of war, directly or indirectly, of displacement or deprivation due
to the conflict and its geopolitics is beyond the scope of this study. Moreover,
the question remains as to whether there was ever a ‘peacetime baseline’ for
the Federally Administrated Areas (FATA) to assess the current impact of the
‘Wars on Terror’ in the region, as there is none for Afghanistan (Crawford
2015, 20). Taking into account the Geneva Declaration Secretariat’s sugges-
tion to multiply by four the number of direct deaths to estimate the ratio of
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indirect deaths, the scale of humanitarian emergencies in Pakistan and
Afghanistan is immense and the silences surrounding them the more worri-
some, given the approximately 173,000 direct deaths and the estimated
183,614 directly injured in both countries since 2001 (Crawford 2016, 9,
14, 2015, 20).
Zarb-e-Azb is part of a series of over 600 smaller and larger post-2004
military operations in FATA and KPk which have led to repeated conflict-
induced, more often than not cyclic or protracted displacement and migra-
tion from FATA (Khan 2014).5 Indicative of state–society relations in trans-
national conflict configurations and policy-making settings, the experiences
and subsequent narratives of those internally displaced (IDPs, or in military
speak TDPs, temporarily displaced) about the very acts and phases of dis-
placement, temporary resettlement and repatriation are rendered nearly
invisible in Pakistan’s hegemonic discourses. This is true for different
media formats, in parliamentary and other policy debates at the national
and international levels, which are, however, beyond the scope of this article.
One reason is that such discourses and narratives are subject to securitisation
and surveillance practices by different stakeholders at various levels of the
polity and public. In one of Pakistan’s leading monthly magazines, Herald,
Alizeh Kohari (2014) problematises how those displaced are positioned at the
fringes – be it in geographic or psychological terms. Specific labels are
employed, which lead to the ‘othering’ of those internally displaced in the
subsequent public imagination and thus to de-solidarisation with those at the
‘fringes’. This centring objectification is an expression of a (post-)colonial
legacy of fossilising such ‘body-borders’ of a community within the wider
project of contested nation-building:
So little has been known about our ‘lawless frontier’ – the tribal areas – for so long;
[…] the stories that we do hear now paint its residents as either objects of pity or
emblems of fear. More than anything else, fear and pity both create a sense of
distance – it becomes easy to think of the displaced merely as haulers of ration
cradlers, of sick babies or carriers of a ‘contagion’ called terrorism, either victims
or villains in a faraway land. (Kohari 2014, 37–38)
Those labelled are themselves threatened and victimised by militants in
ostensible ‘safety’, in military-controlled camps and at registration points in
Hangu, Peshawar or Bannu (in the province of KPk), militants who terrorise
further an already uprooted and traumatised population. Nationalists or
provincial stakeholders in parts of Sindh, Balochistan and KPk provinces
have tried to bar IDPs’ access to safety and relief services by staging sit-ins or
stopping their vehicles. Their argument was based on a securitised need for
‘containment’ from terrorism and polio, thus imposing borders on those
from the border-lands, this multitude of displaced ‘body-borders’ on the
move (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2015, 343–345).
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Overshadowing this scenario was a large-scale, months-long dharna (sit-in
protest) by opposition politicians and their party supporters in Islamabad,
protesting the outcome of the 2013 elections and contesting then Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif’s electoral victory and government policies. The
dharna appeared to relegate concerns with the humanitarian emergencies
created by Zarb-e-Azb to the fringes of public affairs, as participants of the
sit-in danced in floodlighting in a wave of trendy ‘protestainment’ at the
heart of the country’s so called ‘red zone’ (i.e. where major government
institutions are located), without any signs of solidarity or concern with the
large-scale displacement and emergencies occurring outside the public’s
spotlight at the same time. In a country prone to conspiracy theories,
a sense emerged that the dharna politics – and not the politics of the counter-
insurgency conflict – appropriated the attention and resources of the civilian
governance epicentre.
The following quotes are typical examples of the constrained and complex
state–society relations between Pakistani citizens from FATA and their State,
their lack of appropriation of public spaces of solidarity and empathy. This is
coupled with power asymmetries vis-à-vis the politico-military elite and
within different parts of Pakistan, where the province of Punjab is considered
a hegemonic centre in terms of political clout, access to resources and
governmental development practices.
How can you tell these people, little children, that they cannot go to Punjab?
Which law, constitution or rights dictate that you cannot go there? We are good
people, we love Pakistan and we will continue [to love Pakistan]. God forbid
anything should happen to Pakistan. We will be the first to stand up. These big
people will be the first to leave.6
We think the operation is necessary. They should definitely do it. Because the
presence of foreigners in Waziristan is the government’s doing, not ours. (…) I did
not bring Uzbeks, Tajiks. Today, if I say there are Tajiks and Uzbeks here,
tomorrow, my head will be cut off and thrown there. (…) We do not have the
strength to fight the state. We cannot throw rocks at them. Because those who
came here, we came in peace. We thought our dignity would stay intact. The
destruction of our dignity is beyond your imagination. Our dignity is completely
destroyed. Do not give me money. Do not give me flour. But at least stop hitting
me. (…) No one will save us. No one asks about us. There are people in Sindh and
Punjab but there is no one in Waziristan.7
Their emergencies remain invisible, their voices silenced, while those at the
centre of the geopolitical contestation, those diverse armed actors on either
side of the hegemonic core of the ‘Wars on Terror’ noisily rumble ‘in the
wings’, regardless of the intervention fatigue, if not exhaustion, of the wider
international audience and local populations. Who will ever listen to Fazle
Basir, an elderly poet, whose last wish is to publish a collection of his poems?
How could he imagine doing so, finding the resources while being displaced
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in Jalozai camp (35 km southeast of KPk’s capital Peshawar and approx.
166 km from Pakistan’s capital Islamabad), living in a shared tent with other
members of his family from Khyber Agency?
We were in a situation where fathers could not find their sons and sons could not
find their fathers. It was night; it was dark; children were crying. Women left
behind their clothes and household items. Our hearts ache – our wounds are so
deep that even doctors would not be able to heal them. (…) The conditions back
home and in this camp have shattered my poetry, and have shattered my thoughts
and feelings so that I am not even aware of myself. I am sick and I am feeble.
I cannot work and have no source of income.8
Displacement further produces distinct gender-specific experiences and sub-
sequently reproduces marginalisations, be it in terms of coercion and vio-
lence faced or that most female-headed IDP households are not properly
documented, as human rights defenders have criticized (N.N. 2010). Who at
the hegemonic centres of the ‘opportunistic indulgence in geopolitics of
difference, conflict, and war’, its public discourses, policy-making and mili-
tary planning, as this special issue editors Raza and Shapiro argue its ratio-
nale, is concerned with looking beyond the exploited and politicised veils, or
‘shuttlecock burqas’ as they are often labelled demeaningly, of women from
FATA? Who is concerned about their experiences of negotiating gendered
dimensions of the conflict along with societal normative regimes such as
gendered mobility restrictions, which intersect with the need to resist and to
transgress borders to earn a livelihood, seek medical care or escape to safety?
Illustrative is the case of the 60-year-old housewife displaced from Kurram
Agency, whom we interviewed in Islamabad in late 2015, whose name we
omit for security reasons. She has lived in protracted displacement in the
country’s capital since 2012, after having spent some time in Peshawar (the
capital of KPk province), which she considered too insecure to remain in.
The woman who had a shop at her home was brutally killed by the Taliban while
travelling through Afghanistan to bring some clothes to sell. The Afghanistan route
was not secure, because many people were killed while travelling. We are in such
a difficult situation that even food was not available sometimes. Everything was
very expensive. Those who wanted to bring some food items through Afghanistan
were sometimes killed or kidnapped. Many families are still waiting for their dear
ones. Women’s lives were very disrupted; many were not allowed to go to the cities
as male relatives said ‘you are our izzat [honour]; it’s better to die from illness at
home than to be killed at the road[side]’.
Human rights lawyer Shahzad Akbar (2015) problematises in an exemplary way
the everyday politics and societal discourses of human suffering produced by
the geopolitical and trans-locally fought ‘Wars on Terror’, connected trans-
border military strikes as well as local military operations like the post-2014
operation Zarb-e-Azb. He describes how those living in the designated ‘border-
lands’ are considered peripheral and at the fringes of sociopolitical concerns,
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how their own bodies and thus the ‘border’ that positions them become a way
of life, an ontology of embodied experiences – body-borders – of invisibility,
de-solidarisation, silences and emergencies, whether back at home or in dis-
placement, in public discourse or counter-insurgency policies.
It appears that we have decided to count only our losses – and when I say ‘ours’,
I mean those of us living in the cities like Islamabad, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Lahore
and Karachi who belong to a certain economic class. When a civilian life is lost in
the Tribal Areas – for instance, when civilians or even children get killed in
Waziristan – that is not a national concern. No eyebrows are raised, no account-
ability is sought and any mention of such deaths is brushed aside. This division
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, constructed through class, privilege, geography, and
ideology has brought us to a point where it is not human life as such that matters
but which human that matters. That kind of thinking has made it easy for some to
choose to respond to terrorism with more violence. (Akbar 2015)
The Politics of Epistemologies (Alternative or Not) and Politically
Charged Terminologies
We take our cue from Nayak and Selbin’s (2010) critical approach to
decentring international relations and conflicts, to mapping and deconstruct-
ing the underlying, overpowering hegemonies along with colonial-infused
legacies of othering in addition to the neo-colonial contentions which emerge
out of contested politics surrounding violent conflict. It appears that many
depictions of geopolitical incidents like the ‘Wars on Terror’ are conceptua-
lised, debated and narrated in a chronology of events and incidents centring
on the Global Northwest, according to Nayak and Selbin (2010). On the one
hand, this creates a subsequent legacy of perceptions of threats and fear
through othering, with a unilateral flow of development and demands for
mediation, and, on the other hand, a Global South chronology of depen-
dency, experiences of (neo-)colonial dominance, exploitation and othering,
thus requiring interventions with an uphill struggle for alternatives which
more than often are devoid of a deconstruction of this hegemonic practice of
centring in the first place (Nayak and Selbin 2010).
Mapping silences and emergencies is therefore vital in order to understand
the working of conflict-oriented hegemonies, often imposed and sustained by
stakeholders who have more to gain from conflict and enmity rather than
from peace and more egalitarian sociopolitical projects. Such an approach
not only allows an understanding of opinion patterns and narratives to be
developed, but also enables the mapping of entry points for indispensable
non-military, decentred interventions responding to humanitarian silences
and emergencies and their impact on highly strained state–society relations
in conflict configurations. Having said that, such an approach is
a challenging one as it also problematises key concepts and terminologies
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in discursive use – be it in mainstream media, political or academic dis-
courses. Developing alternative terminologies and concepts would be beyond
the scope of this article; however, it is crucial to take cure from Nayak and
Selbin on what kind of data and insights discourses on conflicts and state-
society relationships are based and shaped. As incomplete as our tentative
exploration in this article is by centring on the displaced in a juxtaposition
and thus challenge of hegemonic discourses through narratives collected
from displaced persons, this hopefully will lead to first steps towards decen-
tring discourses and thus questioning hegemonic frames and taken for
granted terminologies in a very much required debate about alternative
conceptual frameworks and empirical data informing academic work on
international relations and glocal conflicts. This also includes the need for
further empirical research to inform theoretical debates on the issues at
hand – something most likely difficult to conduct in an environment of
curtailed critical social sciences in conflict settings per se and in contempor-
ary Pakistan’s censorship practices of state authorities (and security agencies)
in particular.
We would like to challenge the very notion of the ‘periphery’ of this border
region and its people (displaced or not) in that regard, because FATA is at
the core and at the crossroads of this geopolitical, transnational and trans-
local contestation. It is deliberately kept at the socioeconomic and political
fringes through specific and violent power-cum-surveillance practices and
militarised interventions, part of this ‘opportunistic indulgence in geopolitics
of difference, conflict, and war’ as Raza and Shapiro argue in this special
issue. We therefore try to take cure from Nayak and Selbin (2010, 125), who
critique the centring of peace and security, because it leads to (i) myopic,
centred, marginalised and exclusionary narratives and discourses; (ii) a focus
on institutionalised or militarised pathways to peace, which propose linear
solutions and good-bad dichotomies instead of critically analysing the ques-
tion of what counts as ‘peaceful’, ‘secure’, or, ‘[w]hose political sensibilities
matter in determining when “peace and security” have been achieved?’.
Decentring then engages with the contentious cartography of the glocally
played-out politics of the ‘Wars on Terror’ in a way of challenging the very
notion of centre, rather suggesting that there are ‘no centres – but rather
people and places and positions’, with the story-telling of conflict and peace
to be considered as a corpus of multi-level discourses (Nayak and Selbin
2010, 158–159). There are different forms of centring (or not) and reactions
thereto such as distortions, dismissals, conspiracies (as theories of those
experiencing powerlessness), hegemonies and dependencies. Even purposeful
silences and emergencies are important, presuming that ‘purposeful silence
tells stories about what cannot yet find words’, nevertheless challenging our
political imaginary, understandings of phenomena, vision (or lack) of coping
strategies and alternatives, to discover ‘“the large lessons” in “small worlds”’
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(Nayak and Selbin 2010, 166; Brooks, DeCorse, and Walton 2008). For us,
the centre is not the State and its policies as such but its citizens, in this case
its affected citizens, that is, the displaced and their multiple voices, experi-
ences and relationships with the State and its policies in this glocal war-cum-
displacement cycle(s).
It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the increasing proble-
matisation of and contestation over terminologies involved, such as ‘intern-
ally displaced’, ‘refugee’ or ‘migrant’, whether in academic or public debates
the world over, which are understood to fall short in capturing complex
realities (e.g. mixed migration or migration-displacement) and/or face being
hijacked by politico-ideological projects of ordering.9 We therefore follow the
approach of a ‘deliberately broad analytical lens’ which defines displacement
and anticipatory movement as well as relocation as non-mutually exclusive
categories conceptualising conflict-induced flight/‘crisis migration’ – ‘a
descriptive term for all those who move, including those who require reloca-
tion in the context of humanitarian crises’; that is, being forced to relocate
due to unfolding events, anticipated threats to one’s safety or due to being
directly or indirectly affected, such as by collapsing basic services or loss of
employment possibilities due to conflict or palpable threats thereof to one’s
livelihood (Martin, Weerasinghe, and Taylor 2014, 5).
Following the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and its
Article 2, as endorsed by the United Nations’ General Assembly during its
2005 World Summit, IDPs are ‘persons or groups of persons who have been
forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of
armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights
or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an inter-
nationally recognised state border’ (United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA 2004, 1; see also Cohen
2014).10 This definition is not devoid of problems, for example, given its
state-centric approach in the light of transnational conflict configurations,
longstanding local trans-border communities, unmarked border geographies
and the everyday mobility of traders, labourers, nomadic and pastoralist
communities or simply schoolchildren, thus leading to habitual ‘transgres-
sions’ in spaces such as FATA, occurring at contested borders such as the
Durand Line. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) Pakistan estimated that around 105,000 IDPs have moved either
into Khost or Paktika (Afghanistan) to safety or re-entered Pakistan via
Kurram Agency (see OCHA 2014, 2014a und, 2014b). IDPs interviewed
have repeatedly reported that their direct path to refuge was blocked due
to curfews, violent skirmishes, ongoing military operations, lack of affordable
means of transport as well as past habitual travel practices. This is especially
true in the case of those who initially stayed behind to take care of property
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when others left, believing that the operation would be short-lived, a mere
couple of days. Ultimately, they had to leave due to the heavy bombardment
of the area and negotiate their way to safety. A typical example is the case of
a 50-year-old government employee from Miran Shah, interviewed in early
2016 in Peshawar, who had to travel via Khost (Afghanistan), mostly walking,
and could only get to Bannu after the route was reopened. A 40-year-old
government schoolteacher from Palangzai in North Waziristan, displaced in
Peshawar with his family when interviewed in early 2016, encountered fierce
bombardments on the exit road when deciding to leave. Without maps or
navigation tools they had to wander through the border area in search of
a safe passage towards Bannu, unware of whether or not they crossed the
Durand Line.
We were going, so we had to change our route and started going in Afghanistan’s
direction. We had no vehicles, so our feet were the only support we had for
movement. We took three days and nights to reach an area called (…), near the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas while having nothing with us – nothing to eat,
drink and no clothes to change. Everything left behind at home. We took another
three days to get back to Bannu, again by foot (…).
A further illustration is the case of a 29-year-old student from the University
of Peshawar, interviewed in the city in early 2016. He originates from
Razmak in North Waziristan, with his family displaced to Bannu. Deciding
to return when Zarb-e-Azb was announced, to help his family leave, he was
held up at a military entry point. Subsequently, he had to enter Afghanistan,
stay one night in Khost in order to be able to re-enter Pakistan, using camels
and trucks on his way home, negotiating ‘zig-zag roads’, slow travel, taking
cover from ongoing fighting when in Afghanistan and bringing his family
back the same way, albeit at exorbitantly increased transport costs.
They started launching rockets so we jumped from the truck and started crawling
on the road to the trees. It was the most fearful time of my life. We were hiding
there for a long time and then resumed our journey when the firing cooled down.
My family went through a lot of troubles when they were leaving the region; all the
surrounding areas were sealed. The Miran Shah and Mir Ali routes were comple-
tely closed, so we only had the direction of Khost and Afghanistan and that was
our only link with the rest of the world.
The same is true for what counts as facts and figures, which are either
difficult to aggregate or to gain access to, relying more often than not on
estimates and/or data provided by one of the parties in the conflict. In
addition, international stakeholders, experts and watchdog organisations
usually assume a quantitative underrepresentation of the actual phenom-
enon, given registration processes, access criteria and the resultant
challenges.11 Classifying what counts or who is counted is a way of order-
ing/controlling in a highly politicised conflict-displacement situation if one
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wishes to obfuscate the scale as well as dimensions of the humanitarian
emergency at hand, by deflating or inflating numbers to manage (inter-)
national responses, by refusing registration to certain groups of people to
maintain a specific normative regime (e.g. female-headed households) or to
block access to media and humanitarian organisations to generate a specific
narrative of securitisation and ‘contagion’ for the projection of ‘surgically
concise’ operations. Military operations in Pakistan (and not only there)
remain literal black boxes for the wider public, secured by hegemonic
narratives of securitisation and sacrifice and controlled media templates,
which then impact on governance practices such as counter-terrorism
strategies.12
Claiming there are no IDPs, only persons who will soon go home, the government
created a Temporary Dislocated Persons (TDP) Support and Management
Secretariat in July 2014. Headed by a general, tasked with overseeing response to
North Waziristan’s IDPs and bypassing civilian disaster management entities, it
has further increased military control of relief, which is being used as a counter-
insurgency tool. (International Crisis Group 2015, 22)
Since 2008 a total of 13.7 million Pakistanis have been displaced due to disasters
and another five million due to political violence, mostly confined to the spaces
of FATA and KPk, while the country has for years ranked in the world’s top 10
countries with internal displacement. Some IDPs are trapped in protracted
displacement: since 2005 in Balochistan and 2007 in KPk and FATA. For the
years 2014–2015 up to 1.5 million conflict-induced IDPs alone were counted in
KPk and FATA, while the country has displayed overall high levels of conflict-
induced displacement linked to the glocal ‘Wars on Terror’ since 2004 (with
a peak of three million in 2009). However, all these figures are considered to be
underestimates for a number of reasons. First, states – and thus potential conflict
parties with vested interests in ‘ordering’ – along with outdated census data or
incomplete field data from local authorities/organisations are primarily respon-
sible for statistics. Secondly, unregistered IDPs are excluded (e.g. those in urban
displacement such as in Karachi or those fearing official registration points/
camps due to threats from militants). Third, no regular monitoring of displace-
ment over an extended period of time (e.g. in Balochistan) exists. Fourth, only
those are counted who have fled from areas classified by the authorities as
‘calamity-hit’ (i.e. up to half of IDPs in KPk and FATA might not have been
included), and, fifth, many women are not counted given a lack of identity
documents and purdah (seclusion) norms (OCHA 2016).13 Only those officially
numbered through their computerised identity cards (issued by NADRA and
authorised by local elders and FATA’s political administration) are able to access
benefits. But even then not all were acknowledged – or could pay to be, given
a mushrooming ‘shadow industry (…), providing IDPs with registration slips
and identification documents under-the-table and at a premium’ (Shuja and
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Wazir 2016). Those left out were, among others, those having more than one
address or inaccurate family trees, living with someone registered (even if as
a married adult) or lacking necessary documentation. Two months into dis-
placement the rejection rate for registration stood at 42.9%. Moreover, faulty
records and capacity limitations for verification processes by the authorities
concerned meant that ‘nearly half of all IDP heads of household were undocu-
mented’ (Shuja and Wazir 2016). A further aggravating factor is that IDP
populations are counted in household units, assuming a specific average family
size – in 2014 counted as 5.2 members and in 2015 as 6.2 members due to new
information provided to IDMC, raising the estimate by 200,000 persons (with
the same census, government statistics and field data sets provided!) (see
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2016; 'Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre 2015, 2015a).
All of these calculations do not factor in the constant mobility and fluid
dynamics of displacement in the decades-long ‘Wars on Terror’. A significant
number of IDP households remain in cyclic displacement-cum-migration
(moving back and forth or on to other locations, depending the intensity
of the conflict and resources available). Others face split (protracted) dis-
placement, i.e. with some (mostly male) family members commuting back to
protect assets in FATA while ensuring the safety and well-being of their
displaced relatives, as our interview findings demonstrate.
Of Checkpoints, Curfews and the Quest for Respect
Let us return to Rancière’s idea of inscribing oneself into a symbolic order.
Over the past years, those displaced have attempted to appropriate public
spaces to protest for their rights-based claims to access basic services and
facilities, not to be curtailed in their movements due to camp-based restric-
tions or military-imposed curfews upon return, to live secure lives or to
receive adequate financial support and compensation for damages suffered.
And most of all, not to be subjected to ‘the colonial-era Frontier Crimes
Regulation’ as part of a return ‘agreement’ (Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan 2016, 12; Farooq 2013). Linked to the militarisation of counter-
terrorism operations and related relief efforts, entire communities are treated
with suspicion, as a kind of rights-devoid contagion to be controlled and
contained. ‘The prioritisation of security was evident in the bans and controls
set in place against the IDPs. It was evident when, (…), preferring to hand
over significant aspects of administration to the security forces. And, it is
evident in the lengthy clearance processes for humanitarian organisations
seeking to work with displaced families’ (Shuja and Wazir 2016).
En route to safety as well as upon arrival, multiple ‘borders’ needed to be
crossed; body-borders were demarcated by a series of checkpoints and
military-controlled registration points. These registration points were ‘called
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by [the] military “strangulation points”’, where one had to establish one’s
identity (or not) through ID cards, names were noted down as well as
livestock carried along, the few belongings carried along were checked or
those deemed suspicious were detained (Shuja and Wazir 2016). ‘They would
look through our belongings and then throw them on the ground. They did
this with everybody’s personal items. They would throw things around and
then command us to pick our stuff up’, complains one woman IDP from
North Waziristan (Shuja and Wazir 2016), her recollections seconded by
many we interviewed.
Testimonies of this series of procedures consist of experiences of humilia-
tion, exhaustion and pain owing to long waiting lines without any provisions
such as water, food or shelter in the summer heat, in particular for vulnerable
groups such as women, children and the elderly. In addition, IDPs frequently
reported an abusive demeanour among security forces, resulting in disen-
chantment with state forces, outright trauma, injury and even deaths. ‘At one
point in time, I used to lose consciousness; and many times I found myself in
hospital without knowing what had happened to me and how it happened’,
explains a 23-year-old married male student, interviewed in 2016 at Peshawar
University. The trauma caused by the loss of his home and belongings, the
humiliation and disrespect experienced through being controlled and
checked to the last item carried, through witnessing public beatings or
persons being killed in public by security forces when queuing for rations
or negotiating camp life left him, and many interviewed, with a feeling of
powerlessness and of not belonging in this ‘traumatic time’ of a perceived
new Great Game being played out in FATA. ‘If someone demolishes your
markets, destroys your houses and kicks you out of your area, what could be
worse than that? (…) We can’t say anything or raise our voice against it,
because we get killed then. (…) In Waziristan, only innocent people are
dying’, he concludes, pointing towards the high levels of psychosomatic stress
suffered.
The securitised notion of a ‘cordon’ was also enforced via polio vaccina-
tions on those having to cross. One could argue that this is a benevolent
compulsion to contain a contagion in a world-wide fight to eradicate this
disease. Yet from a displaced individual’s perspective, as pointed out in the
majority of interviews conducted, the glocal ‘Wars on Terror’ include power-
ful tales-cum-conspiracy theories enforced by militants, elders and religious
clergy that such vaccination drives are a way of tearing the community’s
social fabric apart. ‘We oppose polio [vaccination]. They [non-Muslims] have
mixed something in it, which will destroy our children’s morality. (…)
I don’t want to talk about polio. We don’t want it’, vehemently argued a 55-
year-old male IDP who had previously worked abroad and is now displaced
to Peshawar, expressing a representative opinion pattern. Given the propa-
ganda by the Taliban that it represents an un-Islamic, harmful drive to
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control the community’s virility and morality as well as the events surround-
ing the capture of Osama Bin Laden (whose hideout was ultimately identified
in a setup vaccination drive), it is considered as an expression of
Westoxification, another violent and disrespectful intervention into people’s
lives and bodies.
Regardless of the surveillance cartography conducted while people were
under duress at registration points, it nevertheless allowed some to be able to
access state services, to acquire much needed identification documents to be
acknowledged as a citizen, becoming part of a formalised state–society con-
tract. However, many IDPs felt that this included too high a sacrifice, with
too little public support and solidarity and too great a dark shadow of
surveillance and repression hovering above. Or, in the words of one IDP
interviewed, of having to pay ‘dearly’ for the privilege of being ‘made
a citizen’. Overshadowed by the prism of securitisation and collective respon-
sibility for citizens mapped, this codified relationship took shape in the form
of aid distribution cards, later special Watan cards and National Identity
Cards (NICs) needed to access much needed state support as well as to be
able to return. ‘We carry these identity cards around us as if they were
passports. And this Watan card is our visa to return back to the homes we
were driven out of”, Shuja and Wazir (2016) explains one IDP living in an
informal settlement in Bannu, nevertheless deprived of services and infra-
structure benefits in everyday life. Moreover, reports surfaced that those
returning had to sign an agreement that assigns the task of post-Zarb
-e-Azb security to local communities – without providing necessary equip-
ment and training to do so, ‘outsourcing’ security responsibility and once
again withdrawing the state from key responsibilities. At the same time
communities are subjected to tight curfews and mobility restrictions, which
once again cut many off from the benefits of state services needed to rebuild
livelihoods, such as seeking medical care, school education or simple protec-
tion from insecurity in the ongoing ‘Wars on Terror’.
Seeing beyond the Veil – Gendered Experiences of Displacement,
Invisibility and Mobility14
As of 2015, women with children in their care represented 75% of IDPs,
heading 10–13% of IDP households (International Crisis Group 2015, 21).15
Apart from this, women have been one of the main targets of the conflict –
a conflict with a distinct gender dimension of this politico-ideological con-
testation with the State and its normative order, embedded within a wider
geopolitical contestation and gender-based violence as part of the conflict
configuration. ‘Militants would threaten us from the mosque speakers, [or]
from speakers on their cars when they drove through the village. They would
tell us to not leave our houses without a veil, or there would be
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consequences’, explains 70-year-old Gul Badan, displaced from Khyber
Agency (N.N. 2013).
Human rights violations and gender-based violence were either direct
outcomes of violence, such as the assassination of health worker Suriya
Bibi and women’s activist Farida Afridi, or attacks/threats against teachers,
nurses and policewomen. Indirect consequences due to the militarisation and
insecurity created by the conflict and subsequent displacement have led to
under-age marriages, trafficking of women, loss of employment opportu-
nities and mobility in public spaces or loss of access to health care and
education (International Crisis Group 2015, 20–21).
Female students suffered more as compared to males as they [men] can go any-
where. Our students were left with incomplete courses when the military operation
started, while [women] IDPs faced great difficulties; because of diseases the mis-
carriage rate increases, deaths of children occurring while moving to safe areas.
(female lecturer from North Waziristan, redeployed to Parachinar due to Zarb-
e-Azb, interviewed in late 2015)
A female schoolteacher from a village in Lower Kurram, interviewed in late
2015 in Parachinar, spoke of her fear due to the intensity of the conflict, ‘of
sending our children outside. People in our village, especially women, faced
a lot of problems. There was a shortage of food items. It was difficult to go
outside the home, such as working in the fields, fetching water. We were
imprisoned in our homes’.
Khwendo Kor [Sisters’ Home], headed by Maryam Bibi, renowned
women’s activist from South Waziristan, is one of the few civil society
organisations working across FATA and KPk for over two decades, mobilis-
ing women for the FATA reform process, providing basic services and
working on women’s rights for those in displacement or not. In one of its
reports already published in 2011 (thus prior to Zarb-e-Azb), the organisa-
tion documented ‘accounts by displaced women from FATA of sexual and
other physical violence by militants and security officials. Armed conflict has
contributed to men abusing or murdering women relatives with impunity’
(International Crisis Group 2015, 20–21; see also interview with the head of
Kwendo Khor, Maryam Bibi, N.N. 2012).
Gender-specific vulnerabilities substantially increase when in displace-
ment, such as risks of trafficking and sexual exploitation, apart from obstacles
to access to relief goods and services such as food rations and health care
(International Crisis Group 2015, 21). Women were disadvantaged either
when not in possession of a national identity card necessary for registering
with the government and aid organisations or when not accompanied by
a male relative, for instance, when widowed or as a female relative of one of
the many working migrants to the United Arab Emirates. Women might not
have been aware of the importance of ID cards, having been prevented by
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militants or male relative members from procuring them. There were no
gender-segregated registration points and even women with identity cards
faced difficulties. These difficulties range from attempting to access relief
goods while not being allowed to queue alongside men at ration distribution
points etc., to accessing washrooms/toilets constructed adjacent to men’s
ones in a culturally-insensitive and thus exclusionary manner or accessing
health care given the lack of female nurses and doctors as well as female
security forces. Supported by political parties, in-camp held jirgas (tribal
councils/consensus-based assemblies) decided to disallow and thus bar
women from direct access to relief goods, regardless if from a female- or
child-headed household or part of a family. There are also reports of women
being threatened by officials when attempting to access relief or file com-
plaints (Glatz 2015; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 2016; Human
Rights Commission 2015).16
On their way to safe passage, women encountered many a traumatic
experience: living and travelling under constant fear of a militant ambush
or when fighting was ongoing, leaving homes empty-handed and with open
doors, running bare-footed and without chador (large veiling cloth wrapped
around the head and upper part of the body). Or when no transport was
available, when having no food, milk or water to provide for children or
when having to give birth by the roadside. Many interviewed described that
being displaced meant being without access to basic necessities in unfamiliar,
disturbing and highly restrictive circumstances such as in military-controlled
camps or in an unchartered urban setting and infrastructure outside one’s
habitual social network.17 Typical for many experiences narrated by female
IDPs from Kurram and South Waziristan interviewed in late 2015 and early
2016 is the following quote from a 60-year-old woman, displaced repeatedly,
the last time in 2007 to Parachinar.
For the third time we left our homes completely. There was firing of tracers and
mortar shells while we were barefoot. Our feet were injured with thorns while
running. When I looked behind, it seemed to me as [if] all stars are falling from
the sky. (…) The scenes from that night keep playing in my mind. (…) Unlike the
first time, we were not welcomed this time. (…), my brother told me ‘It is better to
leave, because we cannot bear pictures of our women in militants’ cell phones’. (…)
Most of the village was empty. My brother told me to go empty-handed. It was
difficult to leave everything for a third time, so I looked around in the room and hid
an iron under my dupatta [large scarf/shawl]. I gave it to my relative after reaching
Alizai. I was worried about my brother. Our large family was separated from one
another. We left our beautiful homes unlocked. I can bear everything, but my
brother’s death is unbearable [crying]. We faced a lot of problems [crying]. (…)
When we came here, we stayed in the Imam Bargah of Parachinar for some time.
People provided us food, burqas and dupattas. Then we entered empty homes which
were left by people. We entered empty homes and we had nothing to eat.
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Out of the interviews conducted with women IDPs emerge various narratives
of suffering, trauma, insecurity and deprivation. These encompass tales of
walking bare-footed, without proper chador and losing one’s children when
running to save one’s life or of dealing with mental disturbances of children
and relatives. How to negotiate conflict-induced insecurities while providing
care featured prominently in women’s narrations – either as direct experi-
ences or indirectly when helping other IDP women upon their arrival. Such
accounts are also replicated by many of the men displaced, concerned with
the specific hardships for female relatives. Pashto poetry has always served as
poetry of resistance, also in displacement, such as in the words of
Muhammad Salem, displaced to Bannu: ‘Look at what has happened,
o Khattak, our women are bareheaded and barefoot, forced out of their
homes; see what has become of us’ (Kohari 2014, 40).
More often than not it is an accumulation of stressful incidents and
challenges to negotiate while lacking access to adequate support and
resources, as in the case of one woman interviewed in late 2015. While
being displaced in 2007 to Parachinar, her daughter and sister were injured.
After reaching Parachinar and setting up life there, she lost her husband and
nephew in a bomb blast, while her son was also seriously injured. Having to
negotiate the hardships of displacement as a widow, she struggles to provide
care, not only for her traumatised sister-in-law, but also without sufficient
familial and government support, as she explained in the following interview
quote.
I had a good life before. After [my] husband’s death, I face many problems. It’s
very difficult to provide food, education and other facilities to my children. My son
was in bed for one year. We had to take him monthly to Peshawar for treatment.
(…) Even our family did not support us in times of difficulty.
Displacement also tears the social fabric of the community and more often
than not shrinks protected spaces of interaction, such as the space and time
for women to discuss their problems when habitually fetching water during
the evenings. The shrinking of spaces for interaction, for example, in camp-
based or urban displacement, thus leads to further isolation of women. In
villages they could participate in the economic activities of their family,
particularly in growing crops, vegetables on the family landholdings, apart
from looking after the livestock, the production of milk, butter, ghee and
cheese. These rural spaces are also in stark contrast to towns and cities, the
urban displacement, and when the separation from one’s extended family
support system presents additional challenges to tackle in situations where
basic service provisions and infrastructure are lacking.
It’s better to have relatives in other villages, so that they can help you in times of
need. My sister provided us blankets, pillows and other utensils. The house in
which we were living was in a deserted area, I was afraid of insects. (…) There were
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scorpions, centipedes and other insects in the home. After some time I bought
a hen which produced chicks, and after a few months, we had a lot of hens. So
these centipedes were eaten by the chicken and we relaxed. There was a large
uncultivated piece of land at this house. I asked my sister to give me seeds of red
beans and other vegetables. So I spent most of my time in cultivating vegetables
and beans. In front of our home, there was an empty house, which was destroyed,
so water from different places like the hospital’s waste water, the city’s nullah [here:
open sewer] and rain water collected in the basement of the house. We used this
water for the laundry, bathing and keeping personal hygiene. For drinking, we
fetched water from faraway places, while for other purposes we used water from
the basement. (…) For three years we used that water.
They had to negotiate strict normative regimes and gendered restrictions on
mobility and access to resources as highlighted above. Such restrictions are not
only due to situations of displacement but also arise in the course of a rising
insurgency able to control areas of FATA and to impose gender-restrictive,
misogynist interpretations. Implications are the destruction of schools for
girls; acid attacks on female students; threats or active bans against women
engaging in agricultural activities, employment in government and private
institutions such as schools, hospitals, vocational training centres or travelling
for private or professional reasons. One violent attack can send shock waves
and signals through the community, as was the case of the health worker Suriya
Bibi from Parachinar, mentioned to us during the course of interviews without
daring to disclose details such as her name. The attack led to large-scale
disenfranchisement of women from public spaces and salaried work, and
from seeking medical care in other cities. As outlined by academic and activist
Noreen Naseer after conversations held in 2013 in Parachinar, many women
health workers and teachers resigned or went on indefinite leave after Suriya
Bibi ‘was ambushed on her way back to Peshawar in an ambulance, [when] she
was raped and brutally killed by [the] Taliban. This was not reported in
newspapers […] nor [was] any security provided by [the] local administration
to female staff working in health services’ (Naseer 2015, 134).
Veiling is also affected (and thus mobility, among other things) – changing
from chadors being used in villages to burqas when in displacement, as
highlighted by a schoolteacher from Lower Kurram, living as IDP since
2007, interviewed in late 2015. ‘We had a good life before. Women were
free to go outside for their work and jobs. Our children were playing in the
fields. In Parachinar, we are limited to our homes while in the village we had
a free life. The purdah system is strict here’. Despite the observance of
purdah, she feels that this is in vain, having being displaced in the first
place: ‘Women are the honour of men in our society. We lost our honour
after leaving our homes’. While this is an outlier opinion documented, many
men were distressed about concerns over women’s purdah, thus privacy, in
public spaces and on the move – be it in camps, on the roadside, in houses
rented, at registration or aid delivery points. Such violations of gender
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seclusion were repeatedly recorded in the interviews with male IDPs, which
impacts negatively on practices regarded as integral to their specific socio-
cultural identity. One negative outcome was not only the isolation of many
women once in displacement – except for those girls able to access educa-
tional institutions – but also their being barred from accessing basic services
and aid delivery while in (most frequently urban) displacement.
Displacement could also have been a potential opportunity to link women
with governance processes and networks, thus positively impacting on
women’s well-being as well as state-society relations in an otherwise highly
constrained, violent and exclusionary setting of practices back at home.
Any Larger Lessons from ‘Smaller’ Worlds?
What emerges from the stories shared by those displaced is a perception of
‘being between the devil and the deep blue sea’, of being caught in the glocal
‘Wars on Terror’, of being orchestrated in a disempowering and dehumanis-
ing way in a revamped conflict configuration of a neo-colonial ‘Great Game’
which demands an exceedingly high cost of protracted sacrifice from local
communities while at the same time silencing them and rendering them
invisible.
Another narrative crystallising out of the many testimonies shared are
experiences of othering, control and vilification, aided by the highly mili-
tarised context in which displacement as well as relief-cum-rehabilitation
takes place. This taps into existing colonial legacies of the label of ‘tribal
communities’, leading to de-solidarisation and contagion-based public
responses and hence the further securitisation of intervention approaches
and the invisibility of local communities’ resilience and resistance towards
militancy, political violence and displacement. This is linked to the narrative
of ‘only God is with us rather than anyone in Pakistan’ – one of experiencing
disrespect, humiliation and sacrifice as citizens of a State in conflict. Of
a State that extends its citizenship rights and basic services in asymmetrical
ways, if not imposing border regimes and body-borders at its centre as well
as its periphery.
While displaced communities have displayed high levels of resilience in
rebuilding livelihoods, in resisting political violence and radicalisation, this
toll has a negative impact on building the sustainable and constructive state-
society relations needed to overcome the conflict in the long term and to
allow for healing and dismantling the many borders imposed, which are
more than militarised gateways and obstacles to belonging as well as to post-
conflict governance.
We can only reiterate that our explorations here are explorations – tenta-
tive and incomplete when juxtaposing displaced and their experiences and
narratives thereof at the centre of our analysis without dismantling the
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prevailing hegemonic discourses or replacing the taken for granted terminol-
ogies and concepts with alternative ones. But turning the spotlight, allowing
for visibility of those largely rendered invisible and pointing towards
a number of problems of key terminologies used are for us small but never-
theless important submissions to a very much required debate about alter-
native conceptual frameworks and empirical data informing academic work
on international relations and glocal conflicts.
The last words belong to Fazle Basir, the elderly poet from Khyber Agency,
whose last wish is to publish his own poems. At least this one will be seen:
I live the days and nights in this world. Some in glee, some in gloom.
I’m left alone amid the lashings of anguish. And I had to endure them all alone.
Some in glee, some in gloom.
These are the kinds of days I live in this world. If someone thinks I feint; I swear
this is how I live.
These are the kind of days I live in this world. Some in glee, some in gloom.
Don’t say it all Basir, cease here. I’ll tell you these tales some other day.
These are the kind of days I live in this world.
Such are the days I pass in this world.18
Notes
1. Interview conducted in late 2015 with 60-year-old woman, living since 2007 in
displacement in Parachinar, Kurram Agency.
2. This represents the case of a large-scale military operation, for example, Zarb-e-Azb,
and often repeated / cyclic large-scale displacements of a predominantly Sunni popula-
tion from FATA, mainly driven by state-imposed, military-controlled mobility corri-
dors to adjacent parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
3. This represents the case of a protracted context of political violence-cum-ideological-
economic conflict and repeated to protracted displacement of a predominantly Shia
minority population. Given discussions with interview partners from Kurram Agency,
Rahat Batool argues that many see the conflict in this agency as one driven by
geopolitical and ideological, as well as economic interests of insurgents given the
strategic location and trans-border illicit trade routes of Kurram.
4. Accessed December 5, 2018. http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/about.
5. This data was provided by Ehsan Mehmood Khan (2014, 38) in the glossy magazine
Pique in what appears to be one of the many contracted articles in favour of the
military operation and its approach, given the tenor of the photos displayed, demon-
strating the military as protector, as well as the data provided, objectifying IDPs as
a ‘contagion’ to be taken care of, to ensure the safe crossing of ‘body-borders’. Among
the assistance details outlined, vaccination ranks prominently: ‘polio vaccinations of
221,000 IDPs’ along with details about cattle and poultry vaccinated. Such record
taking also featured in the regular OCHA updates on Zarb-e-Azb.
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6. Transcription of video interview of M. Ahmad with M. N. Rehman, IDP from North
Waziristan, now living in Bannu, as interviewed in July 2014. Accessed December 5,
2018. http://www.tanqeed.org/2014/07/they-are-not-friends-to-the-pashtuns-voices-
from-north-waziristan/.
7. Transcription of video interview of M. Ahmad with Nur Gul, IDP from North
Waziristan, as interviewed on 24.06.2014. Accessed December 5, 2018. http://www.
tanqeed.org/2014/07/i-am-from-waziristan-and-i-am-not-afraid-of-anyone-voices-
from-north-waziristan/.
8. Transcribed from the interview conducted with Fazle Basir in the UNHCR Pakistan
video ‘The Displaced Poet’. Accessed October 5, 2016. unhrcpk.org/gallery/videos.
9. For a debate on terminologies see the long-standing analyses and debates in Forced
Migration Review, e.g. on the term ‘crisis migration’ (Fagen 2014; Martin, Weerasinghe,
and Taylor 2014; McAdam 2014).
10. Pakistan has signed this document and is also bound by further international huma-
nitarian law.
11. For example, UNHCR and OCHA figures only refer to IDPs registered by the govern-
ment, which by no means capture the whole scale of the displacement and which is
problematised by the IDMC.
12. An example is the case of Cyril Almeida, journalist with Pakistan’s leading English-
language daily DAWN, who has been barred from leaving the country after writing
critically about the Pakistani security agencies’ dealing with militant outfits (Boone 2016).
13. At the time of writing, OCHA provided the following data on registered IDPs from
FATA: since March 2015 188,963 families returned home (76,190 in 2016 alone) while
114,828 families remain in protracted displacement, amounting to a return ratio of
62% (17% of these returning households were female-headed). Those returnees con-
tinue to face a situation in which 72% of houses are fully damaged, thus shelter remains
a huge problem in the upcoming winter months. The return ratio varies within FATA,
ranging from the lowest with 42% in Orakzai to 88% in Khyber. The situation in the
Waziristan agencies is one of continuously high protracted displacement: 44% of IDP
families (out of which 7% female-headed) in the North and 54% (out of which 22%
female-headed) in the South, equal to 84,521 registered IDP families (out of a total of
114,828) remain displaced from FATA due to military operations (OCHA 2016).
14. In this section, we rely on interviews conducted by Rahat Batool (2016) during her
MPhil thesis research on Women’s Everyday Life Experiences of Militancy in FATA:
A Case Study of Kurram Agency, whose transcripts were made available to us. All
subsequent steps of interpretation, evaluation and judgement are solely ours, the
authors of this article. We would like to thank Rahat Batool for her support by granting
us access to the interview data.
15. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the number of women
IDPs is underrepresented due to a lack of identity documents, estimating that women
represent 23% out of the total IDP population and children 54% (Glatz 2015, 3, 7). In
the infographic of the Jinnah Institute disaggregated data for IDPs from North
Waziristan / Zarb-e-Azb alone are provided, which slightly differ from the aggregated
data from IDMC: 5% of households are headed by women, 0.6% by children while
women represent 48.79% of IDPs (Jinnah Institute 2016).
16. In a report by UNHCR’s former community development officer in Peshawar during the
2008/9 FATA displacements, Khadka (2010) outlines as one of the challenges for parti-
cipatory camp management the restrictions faced by displaced women, be it in terms of
ensuring the observance of purdah combined with related mobility restrictions in the
access to washrooms, be it in terms of interacting with female staff members without
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permission, be it in terms of women participating in gender-segregated committees
formed to deal with issues such as water, education, food or security/protection while
aiming to ensure inclusive representation of the whole IDP community.
17. As experienced during the course of the interviews conducted, many women faced
multiple displacements and were not used to being given voice to share their worries
and feelings or to narrating in a chronological way. A number of them preferred to sit
in groups and share their experiences, often with strong emotions displayed, having
rather learnt to silence themselves, augmented by the lack of psychosocial care and
constrained, secluded living conditions in displacement.
18. Transcribed from the English subtitles of the poem recited in Pashto by Fazle Basir in
the UNHCR Pakistan video ‘The Displaced Poet’. Accessed October 5, 2016. unhrcpk.
org/gallery/videos.
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